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Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation
Statutes: "You Can Lead A Horse to Water .... "
"Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever
they can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser-in
fees, expenses and waste of time."
-Abraham Lincoln, July 1, 1850.*
A Proverb:
Samuel Johnson, to Boswell, who had just remarked that he was afraid his
father would force him to be a lawyer:
"Sir," retorted Johnson, "you need not be afraid of his forcing you to be a
laborious practising -lawyer; that is not in his power." Then Johnson
repeated this proverb, "A man may lead a horse to the water, but four and
twenty canna gar him drink."
-Boswell, Life of Johnson, July 14, 1763.**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades there has been much criticism about the state of
the litigation process in the United States.' One recent article, indicating
EUGENE C. GERHART, QUOTE IT! MEMORABLE LErAL QUOTATIONS 429-30 (1987).
THE MACMILLAN BOOK OF PROVERBS, MAXIMS, AND FAMOUS PHRASES 1179-80
(Burton Stevenson ed., 1948).
1 See, e.g., Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, Federal Courts at the Crossroads:
Adapt or Lose!, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 211, 211 (1994) (stating that the caseload of the federal
courts is at a level that undermines the courts' ability to administer justice); Edward D.
Cavanagh, The Cvil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993 Amendment to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Can Systemic Ills Afflicting the Federal Courts Be Remedied by
Local Rules?, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 721, 721 (1993) (stating that the federal civil justice
system is in serious, critical condition because it is too expensive and takes too long); Marc
Galanter, 7he Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 9 (1986) (citing
numerous empirical studies to support his argument that litigation is a "miserable, disruptive,
painful experience" to both plaintiffs and defendants); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better
Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982) (stating that any improvements in the civil legal system
are lost due to the time lapse, expense, and emotional stress of the litigation process). But see
Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 B.U. L.
REV. 723, 738-39 (1994) (stating that claims by politicians that the legal system is running
amok are unsubstantiated); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089
(1984) (praising civil litigation as a method of using state power to bring a "recalcitrant reality
closer to our chosen ideals").
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that the federal court system is in a state of crisis, describes the system's
future as "nightmarish."2 The article predicts that by 2020 over one million
cases will be filed annually, compared to the 281,740 filed in 1994.3 The
"nightmare" of this increased litigation is the huge cost in terms of time and
money imposed on an already overburdened and inefficient court system. In
an effort to deal with this problem, states have increasingly turned to
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 4 The purpose of ADR is to establish
attractive and effective dispute resolution forums for aggrieved citizens
while at the same time relieving backed-up court dockets. 5
The term ADR encompasses many dispute resolution techniques.
Mediation, arbitration, and summary jury trials are some of the more
familiar examples. Of these ADR techniques, mediation contrasts most
sharply with litigation because it is a voluntary process. Essentially,
mediation is a multi-party negotiation conducted with the assistance of a
third-party neutral, who has no power to impose a settlement on the
disputing parties. 6 An important part of any mediation is this third-party
neutral or mediator. The mediator's role is to encourage disputing parties
"to find a mutually agreeable settlement by helping the parties sharpen the
issues, reduce misunderstandings, establish priorities, vent emotions, find
points of agreement, and ultimately negotiate an agreement. " 7 However,
mediation also allows the disputants to retain control of the process because
the mediator lacks the authority to impose an award. Thus, mediation can
fail if one or both of the parties refuse to settle.
To increase the use of this cost-saving ADR technique, many states
have passed statutes that enable courts to order disputing parties to
participate in a mediation hearing. 8 Mandatory mediation may seem to be
2 Randall Samborn, Judges Foresee Federal Courts Caseload Crush, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
9, 1995 at 25.
3 Id.
4 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1801 (West 1993) (in the title of this state's dispute
resolution act the stated goal of the statute is to "help alleviate the backlog of cases which
burden the judicial system in this state").
5 Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An
ErapiricalAssessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 238 (1981).
6 STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 103 (2d ed. 1992).
7 McEwen & Maiman, supra note 5, at 238.
8 IOWA CODE ANN. § 654A.6 (West 1994) (repealed 1995) (requiring a creditor
desiring to enforce a debt against agricultural property to file a request for mediation); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 44.102 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214.4 (West 1994)
(prior to a contested hearing under this Domestic Relations Act, the court shall refer the
parties to mediation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26 (West 1995) (repealed 1995) (allows a
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something of an oxymoron because mediation is fundamentally a voluntary
process. However, mandatory mediation is still a voluntary process despite
the fact that the parties are not participating voluntarily. The right to decline
settlement preserves the fundamental fairness and voluntariness of
mediation.9 As long as a settlement is entered into voluntarily by the
parties, the process is mediation.
However, a serious problem with the implementation of mandatory
mediation statutes remains. Often these statutes do not define the level of
party participation necessary to satisfy the statute. The result of this lack of
guidance is that most parties are forced to determine for themselves what
level of participation constitutes compliance. Some states have attempted to
more clearly define the necessary standard for participation, yet still
characterize participation in amorphous terms such as "good faith."10
However, this attempt at establishing a standard level of proper
participation can create dangers of its own. One danger of an amorphous
participation standard is that it may spawn satellite litigation over
compliance which could undermine the effectiveness of the mediation
process. 1 Additionally, enforcing an unclear participation standard may
require the neutral third party to testify about what transpired during the
mediation, which can destroy the elements of neutrality and confidentiality
so vital to the process.
This Note discusses the attempts to define satisfactory participation in
mediation and the consequences of such definitions. First, this Note will
describe the advantages that mandatory mediation can provide to both the
parties involved in a dispute and to the legal system. Second, it will
examine two cases that illustrate the problems and issues that are created by
an unclear participation standard. Third, this Note will discuss the
limitations and enforcement consequences of the "good faith" and
"meaningful participation" standards. Finally, it will suggest the use and
describe the benefits of a more objective standard.
farm debtor to request court-supervised mediation, which obligates both the debtor and
creditor to attend); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170 (West 1994) (requires that potential litigants
mediate child custody and visitation disputes before the issue is set for trial).
9 GOLDBERO Er AL., supra note 6, at 265.
10 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5430(c)(4) (1993).
11 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Courr-Mandared Alternative Dispute Resolution: What
Fonn of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2093 (1993); see also
NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POUiCY, PRACTICE § 5.2
(1989).
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II. ADVANTAGES OF MANDATORY MEDIATION
The idea of mandatory mediation has met with some criticism. It has
been argued that mandatory mediation may be an exercise in futility if one
of the parties enters the mediation determined not to settle. 12 Since this
party's attitude will most likely drive the dispute to litigation anyway, little
can be gained from forcing both parties through a process designed for
settlement. 13 Another argument against mandatory mediation statutes is that
a mandatory process simply creates another legal obstacle for the parties to
overcome on their way to litigation. 14 Additionally, it has been asserted that
unsuccessful mediation followed by litigation merely adds to the costs of the
litigation process by forcing parties to double their efforts in settling a
case. 15
Mediation's dependence on the cooperative efforts of the parties seems
to call into question the utility of mandating the process. Because the parties
control the process, mediation may fail if one party simply refuses to settle.
However, several advantages of mandatory mediation do exist.
The first advantage of mandatory mediation is that it may in fact
accelerate the settlement process. Our present litigation system places the
greatest impetus for settlement at the end of the dispute process. That is
why many disputes settle on the proverbial "court house steps" or during
the "eleventh hour." Mandatory mediation shifts the settlement impetus by
requiring parties to think about compromise at earlier stages in the dispute
process. 16 The imminence of mediation, much like the imminence of trial,
can serve as a "settlement event" that induces parties and attorneys to focus
on the case and to enter into serious negotiations.17 Once the parties are in
mediation, the trained mediator adds structure to the settlement process and
can facilitate frank discussions that can lead to settlement.18 Discussions in
12 Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing an ADR Clause-Are Good Intentions All You Have?, 26
AM. BUS. L.J., 575, 583 (1988).
13 id.
14 Susan C. Kuhn, Comment, Mandatory Mediation: California Civil Code Section
4607, 33 EMORY L.J. 733, 758 (1984).
15 Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 19 (1995).
16 Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668, 673 (1986).
17 CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CPR MODEL ADR PROCEDURES AND
PRACTICES: MEDIATION 1-5 (1994).
18 Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fair
and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1091 (1990) (discussing the mediator's
ability "to spur settlement by overcoming difficulties such as a lack of effective
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the presence of a mediator tend to reduce misunderstandings, and
antagonism frequently subsides. Even when parties fail to reach a
settlement, the enhanced mutual understanding resulting from the mediation
process greatly improves the prospects for a later agreement.19
Second, mandatory mediation requires parties, initially hostile to the
process of mediation, to participate and possibly settle their dispute via
mediation. Experience shows that parties often benefit from mediation
despite the fact that their participation in the mediation is a result of a court
order. 20 An experiment conducted in 1980-81 studied the effect of
mediation in the coal industry. 21 The participants had never used mediation
but had always utilized the more adjudicatory arbitration process. The
results showed that mediation was successful in resolving eighty-nine
percent of the grievances. 22 Moreover, all groups of mediation participants
preferred mediation to arbitration. The results showed that seventy-seven
percent of the grievants whose disputes were mediated were satisfied with
the process, as compared to forty-five percent of the grievants using
arbitration.3 This data suggests that increasing the use of mediation will
decrease costs as more parties have the opportunity to settle out of court.
Reported rates of settlement achieved in mediation vary greatly.24
Published estimates for settlement in the various forms (mandatory and non-
mandatory) of mediation range between twenty percent and eighty percent
with a median of sixty percent.25 Even using the most conservative of these
estimates, if two of every ten cases bound for trial settle via mandatory
mediation substantial savings in time and money would accrue to the court
communication, different assessments of information, different attitudes toward risk, or
constituency pressures").
19 CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CPR MODEL ADR PROCEDURES
AND PRACTICES: MEDIATION 1-22 (1994).
20 Craig A. McEwen & Thomas W. Milburn, Explaining a Paradox of Mediation, 9
NEGOTIATION J. 23, 23 (1993) ("[R]eluctant parties often use mediation effectively and
evaluate their mediation experiences positively.").
- 21 Stephen B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perspectives on the Differences
Between Mediation and Arbitration, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 249 (1990).
2 2 Id. at 250-5 1.
23 d.
24 Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruiu, Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the
Mediation of Social Conflict, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 394, 394-99 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds.,
1989).
25 Id. at 397.
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system and the parties. 26 Court-ordered mediation provides the parties an
opportunity to settle while, in turn, providing the legal system an
opportunity to reduce the number of cases going to trial.27
Further, court-ordered mediation is an effective means of obtaining
binding, out-of-court settlements. In 1985, McLean County, Virginia,
established a court-ordered divorce mediation program and reported success
in reaching custody and visitation agreements. 28 In the first year of the
program, approximately sixty percent of the client couples were able to
effectively mediate the living arrangements for their children without using
the adversarial process. 29 Interviews with the attorneys who participated in
the program revealed positive results. Despite several suggestions to
eliminate the mandate and make participation voluntary, these attorneys
reported that the mandatory process saved time and money for clients who
would otherwise have gone to trial and that the process generally reduced
trauma for the entire family.30
A third advantage of mandatory mediation is that mandating the process
overcomes the sign of weakness that is often associated with mediation. A
lingering perception in the legal community is that to suggest mediation to
an adversary is a sign of a weak case or a weak party; that "[r]eal men don't
mediate." 3 1 Many lawyers view the suggestion of compromise as an
admission of weakness and because of this view will delay the dispute
resolution process with the hope that the onus of suggesting settlement will
fall on the opposing party.32 However, when a statute mandates
participation in mediation, it may be accomplishing what the parties secretly
want, but will not express.
26 Lawrence J. Brennan, introduction: Alternative Dispute Resolution - Litigation
Solutions for the 90's and Beyond, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, Apr. 21, 1993, at 1. This
commentator reports on the use of ADR in the Nassau County, New York court system. Costs
estimated at nearly $10,225 in fixed discovery and trial costs per case as well as 100-200
hours of attorney time for discovery, conferences, trial preparation, research and trial for each
lawsuit may be avoided when an ADR technique is utilized.
27 Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-
Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 50.
28 Lynette C. Hale & James A. Knecht, Enriching Divorced Families Through Grass
Roots Development of Community-Wide Court-Referred Mediation Services, 24
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 6, 15 (1986).
29 
Id. at 13.
30 ld. at 14.
31 Edward A. Dauer, Impediments to ADR, 18 COLO. LAW. 839, 839 (1989).
32 Edwards, supra note 16, at 670.
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Additionally, rates of voluntary usage are low because parties or their
lawyers are more accustomed to the litigation process. 33 Mandatory
mediation increases the exposure and hence the familiarity with the process.
Parties that are more familiar with mediation are more likely to take
advantage of its cost-savings and efficiency even when the process is not a
result of a court order.
The advantages of mandatory mediation are extensive, and powerful
arguments can be made for continuing the use of mediation through statutes
mandating the process. However, there is a problem with the enforcement
of these statutes. The problem lies in defining the level of participation that
constitutes compliance with the statute. When contemplating this dilemma
one is reminded of the old adage: "You can lead a horse to water, but you
can't make it drink." Many state legislatures have "led the horse to water"
by ordering parties to submit to mediation, but have not been able to "make
it drink" because settlement cannot be imposed on these disputing parties.
The problem becomes how to objectively define a satisfactory level of
participation while at the "trough." This is the central challenge associated
with participation standards in mandatory mediation statutes.
IlI. THE PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH PARTICIPATION STANDARDS
IN MANDATORY MEDIATION STATUTES
Mediation is a cooperative process and in order for it to be successful,
the process requires satisfactory participation by the parties. However, most
parties in a mediation do not know what constitutes satisfactory
participation. This problem surrounding participation standards derives
from mediation becoming mandatory in state dispute-resolution statutes.
Before mandatory mediation, participation in the process was voluntary. If
party A predetermined that the dispute was to be litigated, then party A
simply did not participate in the mediation process. However, with the
advent of mandatory mediation statutes, party A is now compelled to
participate and must determine what minimum level of participation is
necessary to constitute compliance with the statute. This often results in a
discretionary decision by the parties and inconsistent results from the
process.
Unfortunately, legislatures often fail to help explain what is required by
the parties in order to have satisfactorily participated in the mediation
process. The result is a participation standard that is unclear and difficult to
enforce. For example, an Iowa statute concerning farmer-creditor disputes
required the creditor to file a mediation request and to obtain a mediation
33 GOLDBERG Er AL., supra note 6, at 264.
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release before proceeding with the forfeiture process.3 4 Beyond filing a
mediation request, and presumably attending a mediation hearing, the
requirements of participation for the parties are ambiguous. This ambiguity
is the central issue in the following case.
In Graham v. Baker,3 5 the creditors' attorney filed the requisite
mediation request and attended the hearing. At the session, the creditors'
attorney refused to cooperate with the mediator and denied the opposing
party any chance to put forward a proposal for resolving the dispute.3 6 The
creditors' attorney became increasingly more "agitated" and "belligerent,"
accused his opponent of bad faith, and finally demanded that the opposing
party either sell the land within thirty days or forfeit the property.3 7 In the
words of Justice Snell, "It was clear that [creditors' attorney] was hostile to
the [opposing party], the mediator, and the mediation process. "8
The creditors' attorney then demanded from the mediator that his client
be given a mediation release. Quite understandably, given the attorney's
behavior, the mediator refused, granting instead an extra thirty days to
attempt mediation. 39 The creditor went to district court and was granted a
writ of mandamus to force the mediation service to issue the mediation
release. 40 The opposing party appealed, and the Iowa Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the creditors' attorney had
participated in the mediation to the satisfaction of the statute.
The Iowa Supreme Court held that the creditors' attorney had attended
the mediation hearing as required and had satisfactorily participated, despite
the fact that he stated that his position was not negotiable. 4 1 Supporting this
holding, the court reasoned that the mediation service did not have the
power to compel either party to negotiate, rather the mediation "merely
attempts to set up conditions in which the parties might find a solution to
their problems ... "42 Despite the cajoling and inappropriate behavior, the
Iowa Supreme Court found that the mere presence of the creditors' attorney
satisfied the minimal participation required by the statute.43
It is obvious that the creditors' attorney turned this mediation into a
wasted process. Such behavior, if condoned, simply reduces the mediation
34 IOWA CODE ANN. § 654A.6.1 (West 1994) (repealed 1995).
35 447 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa 1989).
36 447 N.W.2d at 398.
3 7 id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 398.
41 447 N.W.2d at 401.
42 id.
43 Id.
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process to an obstacle of inefficiency on the way to a forfeiture proceeding.
One wonders whether such a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court simply
encourages unruly behavior and undermines the objectives of the mediation
process as a whole. The actions by the creditors' attorney seem to
demonstrate the need for a more strict participation standard in mandatory
mediation.
A participation standard can be made more strict by requiring both
parties to submit an opening offer, consider their opponent's offer, and then
propose a counteroffer. A standard can be even more strict still by imposing
trial and attorney costs on a party that does not better its counteroffer. 44
Yet, a more strict participation standard is not necessarily the proper
response to behavior like that of the creditors' attorney in Graham.
Obviously, Graham was a party who was not going to settle voluntarily and
sought to resolve this case at trial. In mediation, parties always have the
right to decline settlement and risk litigation; this is the essence of a
voluntary process. A more strict participation standard would have
controlled the behavior of the creditors' attorney, but would not have saved
the parties any time or money.
Another case that focused on the issue of adequate participation in a
court-ordered dispute resolution process was Gilling v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc.45 The plaintiffs alleged that during a stopover they were wrongfully
ejected from their flight over an on-board incident involving knives. 46 The
case was referred to compulsory court-annexed arbitration as required by
the local court rules. 47 The attorney for the airline immediately took an
uncooperative stance during the hearing. The arbitrator stated he was
"flabbergasted" that defendant's attorney arrived at the hearing with no
witnesses. 48 Further demonstration of this attorney's contempt for the court-
ordered process was her response to the arbitrator's question about
damages: "We don't care what you do, we won't pay it anyway. " 49 Within
44 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.06.060 (West 1994) (costs and reasonable
attorney's fees may be assessed against a party appealing from the award who fails to improve
his position on the trial de nova).
45 680 F. Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1988). The ADR technique in this case was court-annexed
arbitration, a mandatory, non-binding form of adjudication where the issue of party
participation is similar to mandatory mediation by analogy.
46 Id. at 170. Plaintiffs sought damages for breach of contract, negligence, false
imprisonment, battery, assault, slander, invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress,
and conversion. Id.
47 U.S. Dist. Ct., D.N.J. R. 47C.1 (requiring compulsory arbitration for any civil action
where the relief sought consists only of money damages not in excess of $100,000).
48 Gilling, 680 F. Supp. at 170.
4 9 id.
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the thirty days allotted by the local rules, the airline moved for a trial de
novo. 50 The plaintiffs opposed the motion, contending that defendant's
failure to participate meaningfully in the arbitration deprived the airline of
its right to demand a trial de novo. 51 The Gilling court imposed sanctions
on defendant's attorney stating that her participation rendered the
proceeding a "sham" because "she merely went through the motions. "52
At first glance, the Graham and Gilling cases seem to demonstrate the
need for a more strict participation standard. One could argue that with an
exacting standard and the ability to impose sanctions for noncompliance, a
court could ensure genuine participation from the parties. However, the
"teeth" of a strict participation standard and threat of sanction may result in
undermining one of the stated objectives of mandatory mediation-
promoting efficiency. 53
It is inefficient for parties to be forced to participate in a costly, time-
consuming process that is futile. However, sanctioning a party, or that
party's attorney, simply because he or she was not polite is also inefficient.
In Gilling, the defense attorney's conduct caused the court-ordered ADR
process to be a waste of time and money for the plaintiffs. But, if the
defense attorney in the Gilling case had thoughtfully listened to the
plaintiffs' proposals and then presented completely unreasonable, but
pleasantly delivered counterproposals, it is doubtful that the court would
have imposed sanctions. Yet, such a "polite" proceeding would still be a
"sham" because there is still no ability for the parties to reach a voluntary,
mutually agreed upon resolution.
In the Graham and Gilling cases, it was clear from the beginning that
one party had resolved itself against voluntary settlement. Once a party
demonstrates that the possibility of voluntary settlement is eliminated, it is
more efficient to let the case go to trial. In both the Graham and Gilling
cases, it was not efficient to continue a voluntary, non-binding process once
settlement had been foreclosed. When this point in the mediation process is
reached, the proper response is to simply let the parties litigate.
Mandatory mediation is not meant to be a complete substitute for
litigation. The purpose of this mandatory mediation, and all of ADR, is to
provide an effective forum for parties to settle their disputes while saving
time and money for themselves and the overburdened legal system. Even if
the parties satisfactorily participate, it may be appropriate for them to
50 id.
51id.
52 Id.
53 Gilling, 680 F. Supp. at 170. In describing the behavior of the defendant's attorney,
Justice Sarokin stated, "Rather than reducing the cost and promoting efficiency in the system,
such an attitude increases the costs and reduces the efficiency." Id.
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discontinue mediation and go on to litigate. The proper response to cases
like Graham and Gilling is not a more strict participation standard and
increased sanctions for noncompliance. Rather, the legislatures of states
with mandatory mediation statutes need to clearly define the standard of
necessary participation and include this standard in their mandatory
mediation statutes.
IV. PARTICIPATION STANDARDS IN MANDATORY MEDIATION
STATUTES
As stated previously, most mandatory mediation statutes fail to provide
any guidance for the required level of participation by the parties. A few
states have attempted to define the necessary level of participation by
quantifying it in terms of "good faith," but courts have had difficulty
enforcing this standard. Additionally, commentators suggest that parties
must "meaningfully participate" in order to comply with a mandatory
mediation statute, but courts have had equal difficulty enforcing this
standard. The following text is a discussion of these possible standards and
the consequences that may arise from their use.
A. Good Faith Standard
Legislatures have consistently failed to adequately specify the necessary
level of participation in their mandatory mediation statutes. The
development of a clearly defined and workable participation standard is
certainly easier said than done. Some states have attempted to alleviate this
problem by including language in the statute that compels participants to
make a "good faith effort" at resolving the dispute.54 This attempt to clarify
the definition of participation is an acknowledgment that mediation, as a
non-binding process, will be a futile exercise unless the parties are willing
to present their best arguments and listen to counterarguments with an open
mind. 55
Even with these attempts at clarity, the questions as to what constitutes
compliance remain because defining a participation standard in terms of
good faith is inherently ambiguous. 56 The ambiguity of this legal concept
54 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5430(c)(4) (West 1992) (this section makes it a
.prohibited practice" for parties in a teacher contract dispute to willfully refuse to participate
in good faith in a court-ordered mediation session); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214.4
(West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27.1 (West 1988 &Supp. 1995) (repealed 1995).
55 Sherman, supra note 11, at 2089.
56 Id. at 2093.
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has been recognized by courts. "'Good faith' is an intangible and abstract
quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition .... An
individual's personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and inner
spirit and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his
protestations alone." 57 In its farmer-lender mediation act, the Minnesota
state legislature attempted to explain what good faith is by defining what
good faith is not.58 The statute listed six actions by a party that constitute
not participating in good faith including "behavior which evidences lack of
good faith by the party." 59 This circuitous definition of good faith identifies
the problem in dealing with this vague concept. The main criticism of the
good faith standard is that it seems to require a subjective evaluation of a
party's motives rather than a party's conduct. 6° This subjectivity would
force the courts to make exhaustive investigations into the bargaining during
the mediation process, and thereby, severely undermine the objectives of
economy and efficiency. 61 Thus, such overregulation adds to, instead of
subtracting from, an already heavy burden on the courts.
B. Meaningful Participation Standard
Another suggested participation standard requires meaningful
participation from the parties during the mediation. 62 Although no current
mandatory mediation statutes employ a meaningful participation standard,
the Florida rules for court-appointed mediators instruct a mediator to end a
mediation session if one or more of the parties is unwilling to participate in
a "meaningful manner."63 Attempting to determine what constitutes
57 Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 259-60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954).
58 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (repealed 1995).
59 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (repealed 1995). The
entire list was as follows: (1) a failure on a regular or continuing basis to attend and
participate in mediation sessions without cause; (2) failure to provide full information
regarding the financial obligations of the parties and other creditors; (3) failure of the creditor
to designate a representative to participate in the mediation with authority to make binding
commitments within one business day to fully settle, compromise, or otherwise mediate the
matter, (4) lack of a written statement of debt restructuring alternatives and a statement of
reasons why alternatives are unacceptable to one of the parties; (5) failure of a creditor to
release funds from the sale of farm products to the debtor for necessary living and farm
operating expenses; or (6) other similar behavior which evidences lack of good faith by the
party. Id.
60 Sherman, supra note 11, at 2093.
61 Td.
62 Note, supra note 18, at 1096.
63 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 10.050(b) (West 1995).
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"meaningful" participation is almost as difficult and subjective an exercise
as determining what constitutes "good faith." Just as there is a risk of
satellite litigation due to the subjectivity of the good faith standard, the
subjectivity inherent in the meaningful participation standard also carries
that risk.
Some have attempted to reduce this subjectivity by more clearly
defining meaningful participation. One commentator suggests that
meaningful participation obligates the parties to consider, and reconsider,
the positions and interests of both sides, and to think about ways to resolve
the dispute.64 This definition does slightly reduce the subjectivity of this
standard; however, it creates new problems. Enforcement of this standard
would require the courts to make inquiries into the specific actions of the
parties to determine if consideration and reconsideration were granted. In
New Jersey, where the Gilling case was tried, federal court rules require the
parties who participate in court-ordered arbitration to do so in a meaningful
manner. 65 Clearly, the defense attorney in this case did not participate in a
"meaningful manner" and was deserving of a sanction. However, not all
cases will be this blatant.
As a participation standard becomes more defined by requiring or
prohibiting certain actions by the parties, it cuts deeply into litigant
autonomy that the legal system seeks to protect. The higher the level of
participation required, the greater the danger of forcing a party to present its
case in a manner not of its choosing. 66 A proper participation standard
should encourage the parties to actively participate in the voluntary process
of mediation and preserve the parties' right to refuse settlement and go to
trial. A proper participation standard for mandatory mediation would
require only such participation as is needed to prevent frustration of the
process. 67 The participation standard in a mandatory mediation statute
should encourage, but not require, interactive participation between the
parties.
C. Consequences
There are consequences that result from a participation standard in a
mandatory mediation statute that is either unclear or over-defined. Either
64 Leonard L. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons
ofG. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059, 1114 (1991).
65 U.S. Dist. Ct., D.N.J. R. 47E.3: "In the event that a party fails to participate in the
arbitration process in a meaningful manner, the arbitrator shall make that determination and
shall support it with specific written findings filed with the Clerk."
66 Sherman, supra note 11, at 2094.
67 Id. at 2112.
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way, the participation necessary to comply with the statute is ill-defined,
resulting in losses of economy and efficiency for all parties. Further
consequences that result from an ill-defined participation standard are
satellite litigation and loss of mediator confidentiality.
A basic principle in ADR is that as the requirements and sanctions for
non-compliance are increased, there is increased legal coercion to participate
in the ADR procedure. This coercion encourages satellite litigation of the
mediation hearings in the form of motions and hearings challenging the
other party's failure to mediate.68 The Graham and Gilling cases are
examples of the additional litigation created by an ill-defined participation
standard. Additionally, one could easily anticipate a number of lawsuits
initiated to determine if a party complied with an over-defined participation
standard such as the one used in the Minnesota farmer-lender mediation
act. 69 A participation standard that creates additional litigation wastes the
time and money of the parties and adds to an already overburdened legal
system instead of relieving these burdens as the mediation process is
designed to do.70
A second consequence resulting from an ill-defined participation
standard in mandatory mediation hearings is a loss of confidentiality. The
assurance of confidentiality fosters the open discussion necessary to
successful mediation. 7 1 Mediators encourage the parties to reveal deep-
seated feelings on sensitive issues in an attempt to uncover the underlying
causes of conflict. Equipped with such information, a mediator is then able
to identify hidden interests and settlement alternatives that would not
otherwise have been considered. Often the parties are assured that the
feelings, trade secrets, or issues that are revealed in the course of the
mediation will be protected by the privilege of confidentiality. However,
attempts to enforce these ill-defined participation standards may require
mediators to testify as to what transpired in the proceedings. Some
commentators suggest that increased testimony about the mediation process
would change this perceived confidentiality of the process and thus
discourage participation.72
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the importance of confidentiality in
NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc.73 In this case, the defendant sought the
testimony of a federal mediator concerning the agreements of the parties
6 8 ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 11, § 5.2.
69 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
70 Sherman, supra note 11, at 2099.
71 GOLDBERG ETAL, supra note 6, at 181.
7 2 Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need
for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 42 (1986).
73 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980).
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during the mediation of a labor dispute.74 In revoking the subpoena of the
mediator, the Ninth Circuit held that the public interest in maintaining the
perceived and actual impartiality of federal mediators outweighed the
benefits of the mediator's testimony.75 The integrity of the mediator and of
the mediation process as a whole requires that the privilege of
confidentiality surrounding the neutral party be maintained. This decision
confirmed the belief that confidentiality is critical if mediators are to
maintain the appearance of neutrality essential to successful mediation.
76
V. A PROPOSED OBJECTIVE STANDARD
A proper participation standard for mandatory mediation statutes must
first provide a clear and enforceable definition of the participation necessary
to constitute compliance with the mandatory mediation statute. Both the
"good faith" and "meaningful participation" standards fail because they are
not clearly defined. Good faith as a legal concept is inherently ambiguous
and meaningful participation is only slightly less murky. Additionally, both
of these standards require a subjective evaluation by the court or the neutral
party, which is counterproductive to the mediation process because it
produces satellite litigation and potential breach of mediator confidentiality.
This Note suggests the adoption of a proposed objective standard as the
proper means to measure satisfactory participation in mandatory mediation.
An objective standard would increase clarity by defining compliance in
objective terms. Clearly defining the participation standard also decreases
the risk of litigation over compliance.
This proposed objective participation standard can be satisfied with the
fulfillment of two objective elements. The first element is to require the
parties, or a party representative, to attend the mediation hearing. Requiring
attendance will encourage the party to become more involved with the
mediation, which, in itself, makes settlement more likely.77 Attending
parties can better react to new information and spot opportunities for
solutions to problems. Attendance of the disputing parties builds the
cooperation and momentum that can lead to quicker and more satisfying
agreements. 78 Along with attending, the party or representative must at least
have the authority to make proposals and, more importantly, to settle the
dispute. Without this requirement of party attendance and settlement
authority, mandatory mediation will lack the necessary credibility as a
74 618 F.2d at 53.
75 d. at 54.
76 Id. at 53.
77 Riskin, supra note 64, at I100.
78 Id. at 1101.
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legitimate dispute resolution technique. The requirement of attendance with
the necessary authority and discretion to settle is critical to the objectives of
mediation. 79
This requirement of attendance with settlement authority does,
however, ignore the costs associated with attendance. This issue was
examined in G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp.80 In that
case, the defendant, a Philadelphia corporation, was forced to send a
representative with settlement authority to a settlement conference in
Wisconsin. Such a requirement imposes many costs on the principal
including the lawyer's hourly bills, travel expenses of both the lawyer and
the principal, and the principal's time away from work. However, in
Heileman Brewing, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the
attendance requirement in the interest of "preserving the efficiency, and
more importantly the integrity, of the judicial process."81 Similarly, a
mandatory mediation statute that did not require the attendance of the
parties would lack the integrity that is critical to its effectiveness.
The second element for satisfactory participation would compel each
party to submit a letter to the opponent and the neutral third party, outlining
the party's position on each issue in dispute.82 By requiring parties to meet
a threshold of minimal preparation, each side can better evaluate the
viability of their position and the position of their opponent. 83 This minimal
preparation provides valuable information to all parties and can create
momentum for a mediated settlement.
Behavioral theorists Roger Fisher and William Ury describe the
importance of preparation to any negotiation" in their popular book,
Getting To Yes. Fisher and Ury define preparation in terms of a
B.A.T.N.A., or "best alternative to a negotiated agreement." Developing a
B.A.T.N.A. helps a party meet two objectives: protecting against making
an agreement that should be rejected and helping make the most of a party's
79 Sherman, supra note 11, at 2112.
80 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989). This case did not involve pre-trial mediation but rather
a court-ordered settlement conference. The costs of attendance, however, are similar by
analogy.
81 Id. at 652.
82 Kathleen A. Devine, Note, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Policies, Participation,
and Proposals, I1 REV. LITIG. 83, 109 (1991). See also Sherman, supra note 11, at 2094
(suggesting requiring parties to submit a "position paper" in advance of the mediation similar
to pretrial orders issued under the authority of the Rule 16 pretrial conference rule).
83 Devine, supra note 82, at 109.
84 Techniques in negotiation are analagous to mediation techniques because mediation is
a multi-party negotiation with the assistance of a third party neutral. See GOLDBERG ET AL.,
supra note 6.
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assets so the ultimate resolution will satisfy the needs of that party. 85 In
submitting a position paper both parties are required to outline their
respective positions before the mediation. This essentially creates a
B.A.T.N.A. for each party. The parties and the mediators can then use the
B.A.T.N.A.s to identify common issues and move toward resolution.
The importance of preparation cannot be underestimated. Critics may
argue that requiring the parties to produce a position paper is part of the
costly, time-consuming and futile process of mandatory mediation. But,
even without a mediated settlement, the position papers allow the parties to
sharpen the issues in preparation for litigation. A Los Angeles study noted
that attorneys who participated in the mediation process spent less time
arguing over inconsequential details when they returned to court to argue
cases that were not successfully mediated.86 The position paper requires the
parties to do work they would have to do anyway to prepare for litigation
and forces the parties to begin to think about settlement.
This new participation standard increases clarity by defining
compliance according to the objective conduct of the parties. This conduct
requires that all parties submit a position paper and that each party be
represented at the mediation by a person with the authority to make a
settlement. This avoids the dangers associated with enforcing vague
concepts like "good faith." Further, this objective standard eliminates party
discretion in determining what constitutes satisfactory participation while
maintaining party discretion in accepting or rejecting settlement. A clear
and workable standard will also decrease the risk of costly satellite litigation
over compliance and consequently decrease the potential for breach of
mediator confidentiality.
Once satisfactory participation is defined, proper sanctions for
noncompliance must be considered. Appropriate sanctions are difficult for
courts because of the inherent tension in requiring parties to participate in
mediation. Courts must strike a delicate balance between encouraging the
parties to actively participate in the voluntary process of mediation and
preserving the parties' rights to refuse settlement and go to trial. Although
parties may be required to participate in mandatory mediation, a court
cannot order parties to settle. 87 Courts in the past have been reluctant to
impose sanctions for noncompliance with a mandated mediation statute due
8 5 ROGER FISHER & WIIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 99 (2d ed. 1991).
86 Kuhn, supra note 14, at 759.
87 See Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, 525 So.2d 519, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that although parties can be compelled to participate in mediation, they cannot be
sanctioned for failing to settle. To hold otherwise would turn mediation into a "forced
settlement proceeding . ").
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to vaguely worded participation standards or statutory silence on what the
penalty should be.8 8 Additionally, even when courts have determined that
sanctions for egregious behavior are warranted, they have lessened the
penalty due to an ill-defined participation standard.8 9 This suggests that
when the participation standard is ambiguous the level of sanction will be
low. Conversely, when a participation standard is clearly defined an
appropriate sanction can be more substantial.
Sanctions for failure to satisfactorily participate in a mandatory
mediation hearing are designed to maintain fairness in the process. If one
party attends a mandatory mediation hearing without the basic preparation
necessary to properly participate in the hearing, it is unfair to the opposing
party that is properly prepared because that party's time and efforts have
gone to waste. One court emphasized this concept of promoting fairness
when it sanctioned a plaintiffs attorney who was found to be "substantially
unprepared" to participate in a scheduling conference. 90 This court reasoned
that "one of the primary purposes of the scheduling conference is to explore
the possibilities of settlement early in the litigation . . ." and required
plaintiffs attorney to pay the costs, including attorney's fees, that were
incurred by the defendant in preparation for the scheduling conference. 91
Magistrate Collins noted that it would be "patently unfair to have the
88 See Schulz v. Nienhuis, 448 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Wis. 1989) (declining to dismiss the
lawsuit because it would be too harsh a penalty when the statute does not define what it means
to "participate in mediation").
89 See Gilling v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D.N.J. 1988) ("ITihe
court has determined to impose this more limited sanction, although denial of the trial de novo
would have been warranted, because of the lack of clear guidelines as to what participation is
'meaningful.'").
90 Flaherty v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Company, 109 F.R.D. 617, 618 (D.
Mass. 1986). This case was a product liability action involving a bench grinder manufactured
by the defendant. At the conference, plaintiff's attorney was unable to identify the extent of
the injury to his client or even which fingers were injured. Additionally, plaintiff's attorney
could not state the client's amount of lost wages and medical bills or even identify the
defendant's workers' compensation carrier. Id.
91 Id. The court's power to sanction is derived from FED. R. Civ. P. 16(0 which
provides: "If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or if no
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a party or
party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or
party's representative fails to participate in good faith . . . . In lieu of or in addition to any
other sanctions, the judge shall require the party or the attorney representing him or both to
pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including
attorney's fees, unless the judge finds that the non-compliance was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." Id.
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defendant incur costs and attorney's fees to prepare for and attend a
conference at which little could be accomplished .... "92
Because participation under this proposed objective standard has been
reduced to the fulfillment of objective elements, sanctions would be
warranted only when a party failed to attend a scheduled mediation session,
failed to attend with settlement authority, or failed to submit a position
paper. For example, a party who failed to attend the mediation, provided no
reasonable excuse, and then requested a trial de novo would fail to comply
with the mediation statute. Under these circumstances, a harsh penalty may
be warranted, such as precluding a party from demanding a trial de novo. If
the purpose of the program is to save litigants time and money then these
goals are seriously undermined if a party is permitted to refuse to attend an
ADR session and then demand a trial de novo.
93
Less egregious behavior such as failure to attend with settlement
authority or failure to submit a position paper can be sanctioned with a
lesser penalty, such as assignment of travel and legal costs, or simply by
postponing a party's ability to proceed to litigation until that party complies
with the mediation statute's participation requirements. Although mediation
is a voluntary process, a mandatory mediation statute must somehow
provide incentive for unwilling parties to participate properly. A minimally
defined participation standard and appropriate sanctions are necessary for
mandatory mediation to maintain legitimacy and efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mandatory mediation is an appropriate ADR technique to help meet the
needs of an overburdened judicial system. Yet, in order for mandatory
mediation to be effective and avoid the pitfalls illustrated in the Graham and
Gilling cases a clear and workable participation standard must be
implemented. Legislatures must move past the vague "good faith" and
"meaningful participation" standards and establish a more objective
participation standard. This proposed objective standard would have two
simple elements. The first is to require the parties to attend the mediation
hearing, and those who attend must have settlement authority. The second
element requires both parties to submit a position paper outlining their
position in the dispute. Defining the standard of participation as the
92Flahety, 109 F.R.D. at 619.
93 New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 715 (E.D. Pa.
1983). But see Lyons v. Wickhorst, 727 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Cal. 1986) ("An immediate and
unconditional dismissal entered at the first suggestion of non-cooperation is too drastic a
remedy in light of the fact that arbitration was not intended to supplant traditional trial
proceedings, but to expedite the resolution of small civil claims.").
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fulfillment of two objective elements increases clarity and decreases the
need for subjective evaluations by the court or the neutral party and thus
decreases the likelihood of satellite litigation and loss of mediator
confidentiality. As the potential for satellite litigation decreases, the
likelihood of mediator testimony and subsequent loss of confidentiality also
decreases.
This new objective standard is clearly yet minimally defined, and
therefore increases its enforceability by the courts. This new standard will
not necessarily increase settlement rates because the parties still maintain the
right to refuse resolution. When the participation standard is clearly defined
and not unreasonable, the risk of litigation over compliance is decreased. 94
The institution and use of this objective standard will heighten the efficiency
of mandatory mediation statutes and enable disputing parties and the legal
system to reap the benefits of this dispute resolution technique.
Mandatory mediation is not a panacea for the ills of our judicial
system, and this resolution technique may not be appropriate for every
dispute. There will always be parties, or more likely their attorneys, who
cannot or will not reach a voluntary settlement. These parties will proceed
to litigation. The purpose of mandatory mediation and other ADR
techniques is not to push parties to settlement. Rather, the purpose of
mandatory mediation is to provide parties an opportunity to settle in an
alternative forum that is less costly and more efficient. Mandatory
mediation is not the alternative to litigation but it is an alternative.
Mandatory mediation is a valuable asset in our adjudicatory process. A
standard of participation, like the proposed objective standard, provides a
basis for meaningful consideration of the dispute without mandating specific
forms of presentation or interaction with the other party. 95 This objective
participation standard will increase the effectiveness of mandatory mediation
and will allow this process to continue to aid our litigation system.
David S. Winston
94 GOLDBERG E" AL, supra note 6, at 268.
95 Sherman, supra note 11, at 2094-95.
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